Reverse-Engineering Congestion Control Algorithm Behavior

Margarida Ferreira, Ranysha Ware, Yash Kothari, Inês Lynce, Ruben Martins, Akshay Narayan, Justine Sherry

Carnegie Mellon University











Fairness: whether competing applications share network bandwidth fairly

Figures from Kurose, J. F., & Ross, K. W. (2001). Computer networking: A top-down approach featuring the Internet



Fairness: whether competing applications share network bandwidth fairly Stability: how stable bandwidth allocations are (or whether performance oscillates)

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Fairness: whether competing applications share network bandwidth fairly Stability: how stable bandwidth allocations are (or whether performance oscillates) Utilization: whether network links are utilized efficiently

Figures from Kurose, J. F., & Ross, K. W. (2001). Computer networking: A top-down approach featuring the Internet

Beyond Jain's Fairness Index: Setting the Bar For The Deployment of Congestion Control Algorithms

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Ranysha Ware Matthew K. Mukerjee Carnegie Mellon University Nefeli Networks rware@cs.cmu.edu mukerjee@nefeli.io

ABSTRACT

The Internet community faces an explosion in new congestion control algorithms such as Copa, Sprout, PCC, and BBR. In this paper, we discuss considerations for deploying new algorithms on the Internet. While past efforts have focused on achieving 'fairness' or 'friendliness' between new algorithms and deployed algorithms, we instead advocate for an approach centered on quantifying and limiting harm caused by the new algorithm on the status quo. We argue that a harm-based approach is more practical, more future proof, and handles a wider range of quality metrics than traditional notions of fairness and friendliness.

ACM Reference Format:

Ranysha Ware, Matthew K. Mukerjee, Srinivasan Seshan, and Justine Sherry. 2019. Beyond Jain's Fairness Index: Setting the Bar For The Deployment of Congestion Control Algorithms. In The 18th ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks (HotNets '19), November 13-15, 2019, Princeton, NJ, USA. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 8 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3365609.3365855

1 INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the networking research community has generated an explosion of new congestion control algorithms (CCAs) [1, 2, 5, 6, 25-27], many of which are being explored by Internet content providers [4, 19]. This state of affairs brings the community back to an age-old question: what criteria do we use to decide whether a new congestion control algorithm is acceptable to deploy on the Internet? Without a standard deployment threshold, we are left without foundation to argue whether a service provider's new algorithm is or is not overly-aggressive

A deployment threshold concerns inter-CCA phenomena, not intra-CCA phenomena. Rather than analyzing the

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November 6, 2024

Justine Sherry Srinivasan Seshan Carnegie Mellon University Carnegie Mellon University srini@cs.cmu.edu sherry@cs.cmu.edu

outcomes between a collection of flows, all using some CCA α , we need to analyze what happens when a new CCA α is deployed on a network with flows using some legacy CCA β . Is α 's impact on the status quo is acceptable? Our community has traditionally analyzed inter-CCA competition in two ways. which we refer to as 'fairness' and

> Experimental Evaluation of **BBR** Congestion Control

Mario Hock, Roland Bless, Martina Zitterbart Karlsruhe Institute of Technology Karlsruhe, Germany E-Mail: mario.hock@kit.edu, bless@kit.edu, zitterbart@kit.edu

available bottleneck link bandwidth to determine its sending rate. BBR tries to provide high link utilization while avoiding to create queues in bottleneck buffers. The original publication of BBR shows that it can deliver superior performa ince compared to CUBICTCP in some environments. This paper provides an independent and extensive experimental evaluation of BBR at higher speeds. The experimental setup uses BBR's Linux kernel 4.9 implementation and typical data rates of 10 Gbit/s and 1 Gbit/s at the bottleneck link. The experiments vary the flows round-trip times, the number of flows, and buffer sizes at the bottleneck. The evaluation considers throughput, queuing delay, packet loss, and fairness. On the one hand, the intended beha of BBR could be observed with our experiments. On the other hand, some severe inherent issues such as increased queuing delays, unfairness, and massive packet loss were also detected The paper provides an in-depth discussion of BBR's behavior in different experiment setups.

I. INTRODUCTION

Congestion control protects the Internet from persistent overload situations. Since its invention and first Internet-wide introduction congestion control has evolved a lot [1], but is still a topic of ongoing research [10], [15]. In general, congestion control mechanisms try to determine a suitable amount of data to transmit at a certain point in time in order to utilize the available transmission capacity, but to avoid a persistent overload of the network. The bottleneck link is fully utilized if the amount of inflight data Dinflight matches exactly the bandwidth delay product $bdp = b_r \cdot RTT_{min}$, where b_r is the available bottleneck data rate (i.e., the smallest data rate along a network path between two TCP end systems) and RTT min is the minimal round-trip time (without any queuing delay). A fundamental difficulty of congestion control is to calculate a suitable amount of inflight data without exact knowledge of the current bdp. Usually, acknowledgments as feedback help to create estimates for the bdp. If Dinflight is larger than bdp, the bottleneck is overloaded, and any excess data is filled bottleneck becomes congested. If D^{inflight} is smaller than bdp,

Abstract—BBR is a recently proposed congestion control. to completely fill the available buffer capacity at a bottleneck Instead of using packet loss as congestion signal, like many link, since most buffers in network devices still apply a tail currently used congestion controls, it uses an estimate of the drong struetory. A filed buffer involves a long structure data drop strategy. A filled buffer implies a large queuing delay that adversely affects everyone's performance on the Internet: the inflicted latency is unnecessarily high. This also highly impacts interactive applications (e.g., Voice-over-IP, multiplayer online games), which often have stringent requirements to keep the one way end-to-end delay below 100 ms. Similarly, many transaction-based applications suffer from high latencies.

> Bottleneck Buffer Size rating point operating poi Amount of inflight data Dinflight

Fig. 1: Congestion control operating points: delivery rate and round-trip time vs. amount of inflight data, based on [5]

Recently, BBR was proposed by a team from Google [5] as new congestion control. It is called "congestion-based" congestion control in contrast to loss-based or delay-based congestion control. The fundamental difference in their mode of operation is illustrated in fig. 1 (from [5]), which shows round-trip time and delivery rate in dependence of Dinflight for a single sender at a bottleneck. If the amount of inflight data light is just large enough to fill the available bottleneck link capacity (i.e., $D^{inflight} = bdp$), the bottleneck link is fully utilized and the queuing delay is still zero or close to zero. This is the optimal operating point (A), because the bottleneck into a buffer at the bottleneck link or dropped if the buffer link is already fully utilized at this point. If the amount of capacity is exhausted. If this overload situation persists the inflight data is increased any further, the bottleneck buffer gets filled with the excess data. The delivery rate, however, does not

Axiomatizing Congestion Control

DORON ZARCHY, Hebrew University of Jerusalem RADHIKA MITTAL, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign MICHAEL SCHAPIRA, Hebrew University of Jerusalem SCOTT SHENKER, UC Berkelev, ICSI

The overwhelmingly large design space of congestion control protocols, along with the increasingly diverse range of application environments, makes evaluating such protocols a daunting task. Simulation and experiments are very helpful in evaluating the performance of designs in specific contexts, but give limited insight into the more general properties of these schemes and provide no information about the inherent limits of congestion control designs (such as, which properties are simultaneously achievable and which are mutually exclusive). In contrast, traditional theoretical approaches are typically focused on the design of protocols that

(e.g., network utility max tives), as opposed to the ir

> ntal and theoretical approtrol protocols, which is in sider several natural requ vation, loss-avoidance, fai can be achieved within a offs between desiderata, a space of possible outcom ocols:

ira, and Scott Shenker. 20 cle 33 (June 2019), 33 pag

of both industrial and better congestion cont : (as exemplified by the 4, 18, 19, 49, 50]), (ii) th ndliness), (iii) the envi rcial Internet, satellite) nds, latency- vs. bandy s simulation and expen portant for understan sity of Jerusalem, doronz@o u; Michael Schapira, Hebrew si.berkeley.edu

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al. Comput. Syst., Vol. 3, No.



Toward Formally Verifying Congestion Control Behavior

Venkat Arun^{*}, Mina Tahmasbi Arashloo[†], Ahmed Saeed^{*}, Mohammad Alizadeh^{*}, Hari Balakrishnan^{*} MIT CSAIL and Cornell University Email: ccac@mit.edu Website: https://projects.csail.mit.edu/ccac

ABSTRACT

The diversity of paths on the Internet makes it difficult for designers and operators to confidently deploy new congestion control algo rithms (CCAs) without extensive real-world experiments, but such canabilities are not available to most of the networking community. And even when they are available, understanding why a CCA under-performs by trawling through massive amounts of statistica

performance (e.g., by giving applications poor ratings or finding alternatives). Performance matters not only in the mean, but also in the tail statistics. In response, the research community and industry have developed numerous innovative methods to improve conge tion control, because CCAs determine when packets are sent and determine transport performance [3, 5, 14, 18, 19, 36, 49, 50, 52, 54] A key problem in CCA development is evaluation: how can deve

pers, operators, and the networking community gain confidence any given proposal? Real-world network paths exhibit a wide ange of complex behaviors due to token-bucket filters, rate limers, traffic shapers, network-laver packet schedulers with various rtifacts, link-layer schedulers that vary link rates, physical-layer agaries, link-layer acknowledgment (ACK) aggregation, higheryer ACK compression or aggregation, delayed ACKs, and more is impossible even for seasoned engineers to contemplate the omposition of every "weird" thing that could happen along a path. such less model or simulate these behaviors faithfully.

The process of evaluating and gaining confidence with a CCA oday involves some combination of simulation [1, 2], prototype im lementation with tests on a modest number of emulated [13, 26, 39] nd real-world paths [53, 54], and, in some cases, empirical analysis ia controlled A/B tests at large content providers. Simulations and mall-scale tests are invaluable in the design and refinement stages, ut provide little confidence about performance on the trillions of eal-world paths.

If one has access to servers at a large content provider, then /B tests are feasible where a new CCA can be tried on a fraction f the users to compare its performance with another scheme. If he measured results of the new CCA compare well, it increases onfidence in its behavior, but still does not guarantee that it will erform well in all scenarios. Moreover, as is likely, the new CCA rill not perform better in the A/B tests for all users. The aggregate esults of an A/B test may hide significant weaknesses that arise in ertain cases. When such cases are identified, understanding the ehavior of a CCA requires going a massive data analysis, which hav be futile because the operator might not have visibility into he network conditions that led to poor performance. We also note hat most of the community does not work at a "hyperscaler" with ccess to such a live-testing infrastructure, yet has good ideas that eserve serious consideration.

In this paper, we propose initial steps to mitigate these issues Ve have developed the Congestion Control Anxiety Controller CCAC), pronounced "seek-ack" or "see-cack", CCAC uses formal erification to prove certain properties of CCAs. With CCAC, a user an (1) express a CCA in first-order logic, (2) specify hypotheses bout the CCA for the tool to prove, and (3) test the hypothesis 1 the context of the expressed CCA running in a customizable, uilt-in path model. The user's ingenuity is useful in expressing the CA and using CCAC to propose and iterate on useful hypotheses hile CCAC will prove the hypothesis correct or find insightful

Nyquist criteria

tion Cont

Control Protocols Hamsa Balakrishnan, Nandita Dukkipati, Nick McKeown and Claire J. Tomlin

Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 Email: {hamsa, nanditad, nickm, tomlin}@stanford.edu

Stability Analysis of Explicit Congestion

Abstract

Much recent attention has been devoted to analyzing the stability of congestion control algorithms in the context of TCP modifications (e.g., TCP/RED [10], [15], FAST [17]) and new protocols (e.g., XCP [21], RCP [8], TeXCP [20]). The control-theoretic framework used in most previous work is linear systems theory. The analyses assume that the system can be well approximated by linearization, and the linearization is then used to derive conditions for stability using techniques based on the Bode or

We show that linearization is not a good approximation when the queue lengths are close to zero Because the goal of several congestion control algorithms is to keep queue lengths small, the linearization turns out to be the most inaccurate precisely in the realm in which a good algorithm would hope to operate. We show, in the context of explicit congestion control protocols like XCP and RCP, that the stability region derived from traditional Nyquist analysis is not an accurate representation of the actual stability region. Using XCP as an example, we then show that modeling the congestion control algorithm as a switched linear control system with time delay, and using new Lyapunov stability conditions can provide sound and more general sufficient conditions for stability than previously derived. For piecewise linear systems with time-delay, the proposed conditions guarantee global stability. We show that the proposed framework can be used to analyze the stability of congestion control protocols in the presence of heterogeneous delays

Stanford University Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics Report: SUDAAR No. 776, September 9, 2005. This research was supported by an NSF Career award (ECS-9985072). H. Balakrishnan was supported by a Stanford Graduate Fellowship.

Companies are using new proprietary CCAs for different applications

- Video streaming
- Online gaming
- Videoconferencing

Steady State at Low Bandwidth

Amazon Luna

20

sdqW

10



Nvidia GeForce Now

ata was collected from these cloud game streaming services:

luna

Amazon Luna

Google Stadia



D. Caban, D. Ray and S.Seshan. Understanding Congestion Control for Cloud Game Streaming. CMU REU 2020

CCAs are implemented in thousands of lines

of code in the kernel

/* Initial outgoing SIN's get put onto the write_queue
* just like anything else we transmit. It is not
* true data, and if we misinform our callers that
* this ACK acks real data, we will erroneously exit

* connection startup slow start one packet too * quickly. This is severely frowned upon behavior.

* quickly. This is severely frowned upon be */

if (likely(!(scb->tcp_flags & TCPHDR_SYN))) {
 flag |= FLAG_DATA_ACKED;
} else {

flag |= FLAG_SYN_ACKED; tp->retrans_stamp = 0;

if (!fully_acked) break:

tcp_ack_tstamp(sk, skb, ack_skb, prior_snd_una);

next = skb_rb_next(skb); if (unlikely(skb == tp->retransmit_skb_hint)) tp->retransmit_skb_hint = NULL; if (unlikely(skb == tp->lost_skb_hint)) tp->lost_skb_hint = NULL; top_highest_sack_replace(sk, skb, next); top_rtx_queue_unlika_af_free(skb, sk);

if (!skb)
 tcp_chrono_stop(sk, TCP_CHRONO BUSY);

if (skb) {

tcp_ack_tstamp(sk, skb, ack_skb, prior_snd_una); if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_ACKED) flag |= FLAG_SACK_RENEGING;

if (likely(first_ackt) && !(flag & FLAG_RETRANS_DATA_ACKED)) {
 seq_trt_us = tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp->tcp_mstamp, first_ackt);
 ca_ttt_us = tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp->tcp_mstamp, last_ackt);

if (pkts_acked == 1 && last_in_flight < tp->mss_cache && last_in_flight && lprior_sacked && fully_acked && sack->rate->prior_delivered + 1 == tp->delivered && !(flag & (FLAG_CA_ALERT | FLAG_SYN_ACKED))) {

/* Conservatively mark a delayed ACK. It's typically * from a lone runt packet over the round trip to

* a receiver w/o out-of-order or CE events.

flag = FLAG_ACK_MAYBE_DELAYED;

if (sack->first_sackt) +

sack_rtt_us = tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp->tcp_mstamp, sack->first_sackt); ca_rtt_us = tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp->tcp_mstamp, sack->last_sackt);

if (flag & FLAG ACKED)

if (tcp_is_reno(tp)) {

tcp_remove_reno_sacks(sk, pkts_acked, ece_ack);

/* If any of the cumulatively ACKed segments was * retransmitted, non-SACK case cannot confirm that progress was we to original consumption due to
* lack of TCPCB_SACKED_ACKED bits even if some of
* the packets may have been never retransmitted.
*/

if (flag & FLAG_RETRANS_DATA_ACKED)
 flag &= ~FLAG_ORIG_SACK_ACKED;

int delta;

} else {

cop_check_sack_reordering(sk, reord, 0);

delta = prior_sacked - tp->sacked_out; tp->lost_cnt_hint -= min(tp->lost_cnt_hint, delta);

* file when the head was fast (refinansmitted, otherwise the
* timeout may continue to extend in loss recovery.
*/

flag |= FLAG_SET_XMIT_TIMER; /* set TLP or RTO timer */

if (icsk->icsk_ca_ops->pkts_acked) {
 struct ack_sample sample = { .pkts_acked = pkts_acked,
 .rtt_us = sack->rate->rtt_us,
 .in_flight = last_in_flight };

icsk->icsk_ca_ops->pkts_acked(sk, &sample);

#if FASTRETRANS_DEBUG > 0
WARN ON((int)tp->sacked out < 0):</pre>

MARN_ON((int)tp->lost_out < 0); MARN_ON((int)tp->retrans_out < 0); if (itp->packets_out & top is sack(tp)) { icsk = inet_csk(sk); if (tp->lost_out) {

if (tp->sacked_out) {
 pr_debug("teak s=%u %d\n",
 tp->sacked_out, icsk->icsk_ca_state);
 tp->sacked_out = 0;

/if (tp->retrans_out) {
 pr_debug("teak r=%u %d\n",
 tp->retrans_out, icsk->icsk_ca_state);
 tp->retrans_out = 0;

#endif
 return flag;

static void tcp_ack_probe(struct sock *sk)

struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk); struct sk_buff *head = tcp_send_head(sk); const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);

/* Was it a usable window open? */
if (!head)
 return;

if (!after(TCP_SKB_CB(head)->end_seq, tcp_wnd_end(tp))) {
 icsk->icsk_packoff = 0;
 icsk->icsk_probes_tstamp = 0;
 inet_csk_clear_xmit_timer(sk, ICSK_TIME_PROBE0);
 /* Socket must be waked up by subsequent tcp_data_snd_check().
 * This function is not for random using!

} else {
 unsigned long when = tcp_probe0_when(sk, TCP_RTO_MAX);

when = tcp_clamp_probe0_to_user_timeout(sk, when); tcp_reset_xmit_timer(sk, ICSK_TIME_PROBE0, when, TCP_RTO_MAX);

static inline bool tcp_ack_is_dubious(const struct sock *sk, const int flag)

return !(flag & FLAG_NOT_DUP) || (flag & FLAG_CA_ALERT) || inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ca_state != TCP_CA_Open;

/* Decide wheather to run the increase function of congestion control. */ static inline **bool tcp_may_raise_cwnd**(const struct **sock** *sk, const int **flag**)

- /* If reordering is high then always grow cwnd whenever data is
- * delivered regardless of its ordering. Otherwise stay conservative
- * and only grow cwnd on in-order delivery (RFC5681). A stretched ACK w/
- * new SACK or ECE mark may first advance cwnd here and later reduce
- * cwnd in tcp_fastretrans_alert() based on more states.

return flag & FLAG_DATA_ACKED;

```
/* The "ultimate" congestion control function that aims to replace the rigid
* cwnd increase and decrease control (tcp_cong_avoid,tcp_*cwnd_reduction).
* It's called toward the end of processing an ACK with precise rate
* information. All transmission or retransmission are delayed afterwards.
*/
static void tcp_cong_control(struct sock *sk, u32 ack, u32 acked_sacked,
```

```
int flag, const struct rate_sample *rs)
```

const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);

```
if (icsk->icsk_ca_ops->cong_control) {
    icsk->icsk_ca_ops->cong_control(sk, rs);
    return;
```

```
if (tcp_in_cwnd_reduction(sk)) {
    /* Reduce cwnd if state mandates */
    tcp_cwnd_reduction(sk, acked_sacked, rs->losses, flag);
} else if (tcp_may_caise_cwnd(sk, flag)) {
    /* Advance cwnd if state allows */
    tcp_cong_avoid(sk, ack, acked_sacked);
```

```
}
tcp_update_pacing_rate(sk);
```

```
/* Check that window update is acceptable.
* The function assumes that snd_una<=ack<=snd_next.
*/</pre>
```

const u32 nwin)

return after(ack, tp->snd_una) || after(ack_seq, tp->snd_wll) || (ack_seq == tp->snd_wll && nwin > tp->snd_wnd);

```
/* If we update tp->snd_una, also update tp->bytes_acked */
static void tep_snd_una_update(struct tep_sock *tp, u32 ack)
```

u32 delta = ack - tp->snd_una;

sock_owned_by_me((struct sock *)tp);
tp->bytes_acked += delta;

WRITE_ONCE(tp->rcv_nxt, seq)

```
}
/* Update our send window.
```

* Window update algorithm, described in RFC793/RFC1122 (used in linux-2.2 * and in FreeBSD. NetBSD's one is even worse.) is wrong.

static int tcp_ack_update_window(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, u32 ack, u32 ack_seq)

struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); int flag = 0; u32 nwin = ntohs(tcp hdr(skb)->window)

if (tcp_may_update_window(tp, ack, ack_seq, nwin)) {
 flag |= FLAG_WIN_UPDATE;
 tcp_update_w1(tp, ack_seq);

if (tp->snd_wnd != nwin) {
 tp->snd_wnd = nwin;

/* Note, it is the only place, where
 * fast path is recovered for sending TCP.

tp->pred_flags = 0; tcp_fast_path_check(sk);

- if (nwin > tp->max_window) {
 tp->max_window = nwin;
 tp->max_window = nwin;
- tcp_sync_mss(sk, inet_csk(sk)->icsk_pmtu_cookie);

tcp snd una update(tp, ack);

```
return flag;
```

}

static bool __tcp_oow_rate_limited(struct net *net, int mib_idx, u32 *last oow ack time)

if (*last_oow_ack_time) {
 s32 elapsed = (s32)(tcp_jiffies32 - *last_oow_ack_time);

```
if (0 <= elapsed && elapsed < net->ipv4.sysctl_cop_invalid_ratelimit)
    NET_INC_STATS(net, mib_idx);
    return true; //# rate-limited: don't send yet! #/
```

```
*last_oow_ack_time = tcp_jiffies32;
```

return false; /* not rate-limited: go ahead, send dupack now! */

/* Return true if we're currently rate-limiting out-of-window ACKs and * thus shouldn't send a dupack right now. We rate-limit dupacks in * response to out-of-window SYNs or ACKs to mitigate ACK loops or DOS * attacks that send repeated SYNs or ACKs for the same connection. To * do this, we do not send a duplicate SYNACK or ACK if the remote * endpoint is sending out-of-window SYNs or pure ACKs at a high rate.

/* Data packets without SYNs are not likely part of an ACK loop. */ if ((TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq != TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq) && itcp_hdr(skb)->sqn)

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When we cannot observe CCA behavior from the implementation, we can use packet traces





labeled time series

R Ware, A A Philip, N Hungria, Y Kothari, J Sherry, and S Seshan. CCAnalyzer: An Efficient and Nearly-Passive Congestion Control Classifier. In SIGCOMM 2024. Ayush Mishra, Lakshay Rastogi, Raj Joshi, and Ben Leong. Keeping an Eye on Congestion Control in the Wild with Nebby. In SIGCOMM 2024.

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Generate simple implementations of CCAs from packet traces showing their behavior



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Generate simple implementations of CCAs from packet traces showing their behavior

✓ ease the analysis of known CCAs



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Generate simple implementations of CCAs from packet traces showing their behavior

✓ ease the analysis of known CCAs

✓ enable the analysis of unknown CCAs



Abagnale uses program synthesis to reverse engineer CCAs





tcp_rate_skb_delivered(sk, skb, sack->rate);

/* Initial outgoing SYN's get put onto the write_queue

- * just like anything else we transmit. It is not * true data, and if we misinform our callers that * this ACK acks real data, we will erroneously exit
- * connection startup slow start one packet too
- * quickly. This is severely frowned upon behavior.

if (likely(!(scb->tcp_flags & TCPHDR_SYN))) {
 flag |= FLAG_DATA_ACKED;

} else {
 flag |= FLAG_SYN_ACKED;
 tp->retrans_stamp = 0;

if (!fully_acked) break:

tcp_ack_tstamp(sk, skb, ack_skb, prior_snd_una);

next = skb_rb_next(skb); if (unlikely(skb == tp->retransmit_skb_hint)) tp->retransmit_skb_hint = NULL; if (unlikely(skb == tp->lost_skb_hint)) tp->lost_skb_hint = NULL; top_highest_sack_replace(sk, skb, next); top_rtx_queue_unlika_d_free(skb, sk);

if (!skb)
 tcp_chrono_stop(sk, TCP_CHRONO BUSY);

if (skb) {

tcp_ack_tstamp(sk, skb, ack_skb, prior_snd_una); if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_ACKED) flag |= FLAG_SACK_RENEGING;

if (likely(first_ackt) && !(flag & FLAG_RETRANS_DATA_ACKED)) {
 seq_rtt_us = top_stamp_us_delta(tp->top_mstamp, first_ackt);
 ca_rtt_us = tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp->tcp_mstamp, last_ackt);

if (pkts_acked == 1 && last_in_flight < tp->mss_cache && last_in_flight && !prior_sacked && fully_acked && sack->rate->prior_delivered + 1 == tp->delivered && !(flag & (FLAG_CA_ALERT | FLAG_SYM_ACKED))) {

/* Conservatively mark a delayed ACK. It's typically * from a lone runt packet over the round trip to * a receiver w/o out-of-order or CE events.

*/ flag = flag_ack_maybe_delayed;

if (sack->first_sackt) {

sack_rtt_us = tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp->tcp_mstamp, sack->first_sackt); ca_rtt_us = tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp->tcp_mstamp, sack->last_sackt);

if (flag & FLAG ACKED)

if (tcp_is_reno(tp)) {

tcp_remove_reno_sacks(sk, pkts_acked, ece_ack);

/* If any of the cumulatively ACKed segments was * retransmitted, non-SACK case cannot confirm that * progress was due to original transmission due to * lack of TCPCB SACKED ACKED bits even if some of * the packets may have been never retransmitted.

int delta;

ccp_check_sack_reordering(sk, reord, 0),

delta = prior_sacked - tp->sacked_out; tp->lost_cnt_hint -= min(tp->lost_cnt_hint, delta);

flag |= FLAG_SET_XMIT_TIMER; /* set TLP or RTO timer */

if (icsk->icsk_ca_ops->pkts_acked) {
 struct ack_sample sample = { .pkts_acked = pkts_acked,
 .rtt_us = sack->rate->rtt_us,
 .in_flight = last_in_flight };

icsk->icsk_ca_ops->pkts_acked(sk, &sample);

```
#if FASTRETRANS_DEBUG > 0
    WARN ON((int)tp->sacked out < 0):</pre>
```

WARN_ON((int)tp->lost_out < 0); MARN_ON((int)tp->retrans_out < 0); if (ltp->packets_out & tor_is_sack(tp)) { icsk = inet_csk(sk); if (tp->lost_out) { pr_debug("Leak l=%u %d\n",

tp->lost_out, icsk->icsk_ca_state); tp->lost_out = 0;

if (tp->sacked_out) {
 pr_debug("teak s=%u %d\n",
 tp->sacked_out, icsk->icsk_ca_state);
 tp->sacked_out = 0;

/if (tp->retrans_out) {
 pr_debug("teak r=%u %d\n",
 tp->retrans_out, icsk->icsk_ca_state);
 tp->retrans_out = 0;

#endif
 return flag;

static void tcp_ack_probe(struct sock *sk)

struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk); struct sk_buff *head = tcp_send_head(sk); const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);

if (!after(TCP_SKB_CB(head)->end_seq, tcp_wnd_end(tp))) {
 icsk->icsk_packoff = 0;
 icsk->icsk_probes_tstamp = 0;
 inet_csk_clear_xmit_timer(sk, ICSK_TIME_PROBE0);
 /* Socket must be waked up by subsequent tcp_data_snd_check().
 * This function is not for random using!

} else {
 unsigned long when = tcp_probe0_when(sk, TCP_RTO_MAX);

when = tcp_clamp_probe0_to_user_timeout(sk, when); tcp_reset_xmit_timer(sk, ICSK_TIME_PROBE0, when, TCP_RTO_MAX);

static inline bool tcp_ack_is_dubious(const struct sock *sk, const int flag)

return !(flag & FLAG_NOT_DUP) || (flag & FLAG_CA_ALERT) || inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ca_state != TCP_CA_Open;

/* Decide wheather to run the increase function of congestion control. */ static inline **bool tcp_may_raise_cwnd**(const struct **sock** *sk, const int **flag**)

- /* If reordering is high then always grow cwnd whenever data is
- * delivered regardless of its ordering. Otherwise stay conservative
- * and only grow cwnd on in-order delivery (RFC5681). A stretched ACK w/
- * new SACK or ECE mark may first advance cwnd here and later reduce
- * cwnd in tcp_fastretrans_alert() based on more states.
 */

```
return flag & FLAG_DATA_ACKED;
```

```
/* The "ultimate" congestion control function that aims to replace the rigid
* cwnd increase and decrease control (tcp_cong avoid,tcp_*cwnd_reduction).
* It's called toward the end of processing an ACK with precise rate
* information. All transmission or retransmission are delayed afterwards.
*/
```

const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);

```
if (icsk->icsk_ca_ops->cong_control) {
    icsk->icsk_ca_ops->cong_control(sk, rs);
    return;
```

```
if (tcp_in_cwnd_reduction(sk)) {
    /* Reduce cwnd if state mandates */
    tcp_cwnd_reduction(sk, acked_sacked, rs->losses, flag);
} else if (tcp_may_raise_cwnd(sk, flag)) {
    /* Advance cwnd if state allows */
    tcp_cong_avoid(sk, ack, acked_sacked);
```

```
}
tcp_update_pacing_rate(sk);
```

```
/* Check that window update is acceptable.
* The function assumes that snd_una<=ack<=snd_next.
*/</pre>
```

const u32 nwin

return after(ack, tp->snd_una) || after(ack_seq, tp->snd_wll) || (ack_seq == tp->snd_wll && nwin > tp->snd_wnd);

```
/* If we update tp->snd_una, also update tp->bytes_acked */
static void tcp_snd_una_update(struct tcp_sock *tp, u32 ack)
```

u32 delta = ack - tp->snd_una;

sock_owned_by_me((struct sock *)tp);
tp->bytes_acked += delta;

WRITE_ONCE(tp->rcv_nxt, seq)

/* Update our send window.

* Window update algorithm, described in RFC793/RFC1122 (used in linux-2.2
* and in FreeBSD. NetBSD's one is even worse.) is wrong.

static int tcp_ack_update_window(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, u32 ack, u32 ack_seq)

- struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); int flag = 0; u32 nwin = ntohs(tcp hdr(skb)->window)

if (tcp_may_update_window(tp, ack, ack_seq, nwin)) {
 flag |= FLAG_WIN_UPDATE;
 tcp_update_w1(tp, ack_seq);

if (tp->snd_wnd != nwin) {
 tp->snd_wnd = nwin;

/* Note, it is the only place, where
 * fast path is recovered for sending TCP.
 */

```
tp->pred_flags = 0;
tcp_fast_path_check(sk);
```

- if (nwin > tp->max_window) {
 tp->max_window = nwin;
 tp->max_window = nwin;
- tcp_sync_mss(sk, inet_csk(sk)->icsk_pmtu_cookie);

tcp_snd_una_update(tp, ack);

return flag;

}

- - if (0 <= elapsed && elapsed < net->ipv4.sysctl_ccp_invalid_ratelimit)
 NET_INC_STATS(net, mib_idx);
 return true; /* rate-limited: don't send yet! */

*last_oow_ack_time = tcp_jiffies32;

return false; /* not rate-limited: go ahead, send dupack now! */

```
# Return true if we're currently rate-limiting out-of-window ACKs and
thus shouldn't send a dupack right now. We rate-limit dupacks in
* response to out-of-window SVMs or ACKs to mitigate ACK loops or DoS
* attacks that send repeated SVMs or ACKs for the same connection. To
* do this, we do not send a duplicate SYMACK or ACK if the remote
* endpoint is sending out-of-window SVMs or pure ACKs at a high rate.
```

```
/* Data packets without SYNs are not likely part of an ACK loop. */
if ((PCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq != TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq) &&
  !tcp_hdr(skb)->syn)
```

tcp_rate_skb_delivered(sk, skb, sack->rate);

/* Initial outgoing SYN's get put onto the write_queue

- * just like anything else we transmit. It is not * true data, and if we misinform our callers that * this ACK acks real data, we will erroneously exit
- * connection startup slow start one packet too
- * quickly. This is severely frowned upon behavior.

if (likely(!(scb->tcp_flags & TCPHDR_SYN))) {
 flag |= FLAG_DATA_ACKED;

} else {
 flag |= FLAG_SYN_ACKED;
 tp->retrans_stamp = 0;

if (!fully_acked) break:

tcp_ack_tstamp(sk, skb, ack_skb, prior_snd_una);

next = skb_rb_next(skb); if (unlikely(skb == tp->retransmit_skb_hint)) tp->retransmit_skb_hint = NULL; if (unlikely(skb == tp->lost_skb_hint)) tp->lost_skb_hint = NULL; top_highest_sack_replace(sk, skb, next); top_rtx_queue_unlika_d_free(skb, sk);

if (!skb)
 tcp_chrono_stop(sk, TCP_CHRONO BUSY);

if (skb) {

tcp_ack_tstamp(sk, skb, ack_skb, prior_snd_una); if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_ACKED) flag |= FLAG_SACK_RENEGING;

if (likely(first_ackt) && !(flag & FLAG_RETRANS_DATA_ACKED)) {
 seq_rtt_us = top_stamp_us_delta(tp->top_mstamp, first_ackt);
 ca_rtt_us = tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp->tcp_mstamp, last_ackt);

if (pkts_acked == 1 && last_in_flight < tp->mss_cache && last_in_flight && !prior_sacked && fully_acked && sack->rate->prior_delivered + 1 == tp->delivered && !(flag & (FLAG_CA_ALERT | FLAG_SYM_ACKED))) {

/* Conservatively mark a delayed ACK. It's typically * from a lone runt packet over the round trip to

* a receiver w/o out-of-order or CE events.

flag |= FLAG_ACK_MAYBE_DELAYED;

if (sack->first_sackt) +

sack_rtt_us = tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp->tcp_mstamp, sack->first_sackt); ca_rtt_us = tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp->tcp_mstamp, sack->last_sackt);

if (flag & FLAG ACKED)

if (tcp_is_reno(tp)) {

tcp_remove_reno_sacks(sk, pkts_acked, ece_ack);

/* If any of the cumulatively ACKed segments was * retransmitted, non-SACK case cannot confirm that * progress was due to original transmission due to * lack of TCPCB_SACKED_ACKED bits even if some of * the packets may have been never retransmitted.

int delta;

tcp_check_sack_reordering(sk, reord, 0);

delta = prior_sacked - tp->sacked_out; tp->lost_cnt_hint -= min(tp->lost_cnt_hint, delta);

*/
flag |= FLAG_SET_XMIT_TIMER; /* set TLP or RTO timer */

icsk->icsk_ca_ops->pkts_acked(sk, &sample);

#if FASTRETRANS_DEBUG > 0

}
if (tp->sacked_out) {
 pr_debug("Leak s=%u %d\n",
 tp->sacked_out, icsk->icsk_ca_state);
 tp->sacked_out = 0;

}
if (tp->retrans_out) {
 pr_debug("teak r=%u %d\n",
 tp->retrans_out, icsk->icsk_ca_state);
 tp->retrans_out = 0;

#endif
 return flag;

static void tcp_ack_probe(struct sock *sk)

struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk); struct sk_buff *head = tcp_send_head(sk); const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);

/* Was it a usable window open? */
if (!head)
 return;

if (!afterTCP_SKB_CB(head)->end_seq, tcp_wnd_end(tp))) {
 icsk->icsk_packoff = 0;
 icsk->icsk_probe_tstamp = 0;
 inet_csk_clear_xmit_timer(sk, ICSK_TIME_PROBE0);
 /# Socket must be waked up by subsequent tcp_data s

/* Socket must be waked up by subsequent tcp_data_snd_check().
* This function is not for random using!

} else {
 unsigned long when = tcp_probe0_when(sk, TCP_RTO_MAX))

when = tcp_clamp_probe0_to_user_timeout(sk, when); tcp_reset_xmit_timer(sk, ICSK_TIME_PROBED, when, TCP_RTO_MAX);

static inline bool tcp ack is dubious(const struct sock *sk, const int flag)

return !(flag & FLAG_NOT_DUP) || (flag & FLAG_CA_ALERT) || inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ca_state != TCP_CA_Open;

/* Decide wheather to run the increase function of congestion control. */ static inline **bool tcp_may_raise_cwnd**(const struct **sock** *sk, const int **flag**)

- /* If reordering is high then always grow cwnd whenever data is
- * delivered regardless of its ordering. Otherwise stay conservative
- * and only grow cwnd on in-order delivery (RFC5681). A stretched ACK w/
- * new SACK or ECE mark may first advance cwnd here and later reduce
- * cwnd in tcp_fastretrans_alert() based on more states.

return flag & FLAG_DATA_ACKED;

The "ultimate" congestion control function that aims to replace the rigid cwnd increase and decrease control (tcp_cong_avoid,tcp_*cwnd_reduction). It's called toward the end of processing an ACK with precise rate information. All transmission or retransmission are delayed afterwards. static void tcp_cong_control(struct sock *sk, u32 ack, u32 acked_sacked, int flag, const struct rate sample *rs) const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk); if (icsk->icsk_ca_ops->cong_control) icsk->icsk_ca_ops->cong_control(sk, rs); return: if (tcp_in_cwnd_reduction(sk)) { /* Reduce cwnd if state mandates */ tcp_cwnd_reduction(sk, acked_sacked, rs->losses, flag); } else if (tcp_may_raise_cwnd(sk, flag)) if state allows tcp cong avoid(sk, ack, acked sacked);

} tcp_update_pacing_rate(sk);

/* Check that window update is acceptable.
* The function assumes that snd_una<=ack<=snd_next.
*/</pre>

return after(ack, tp->snd una) ||

after (ack_seq, tp->snd_wl1) || (ack_seq == tp->snd_wl1 && nwin > tp->snd_wnd);

/* If we update tp->snd_una, also update tp->bytes_acked */
static void tcp snd_una_update(struct tcp_sock *tp, u32 ack)

u32 delta = ack - tp->snd una;

sock_owned_by_me((struct sock *)tp);
tp->bytes_acked += delta;

WRITE_ONCE(tp->rcv_nxt, seq)

/* Update our send window.

* Window update algorithm, described in RFC793/RFC1122 (used in linux-2.2
* and in FreeBSD. NetBSD's one is even worse.) is wrong.

static int tcp_ack_update_window(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, u32 ack, u32 ack_seq)

struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); int flag = 0; u32 nwin = ntohs(tcp hdr(skb)->window)

if (tcp_may_update_window(tp, ack, ack_seq, nwin)) {
 flag |= FLAG_WIN_UPDATE;
 tcp_update_w1(tp, ack_seq);

if (tp->snd_wnd != nwin) {
 tp->snd_wnd = nwin;

/* Note, it is the only place, where
 * fast path is recovered for sending TCP.

tp->pred_flags = 0; tcp_fast_path_check(sk);

if (nwin > tp->max_window) {
 tp->max_window = nwin;
 tcp_sync_mss(sk, inst_csk(sk)->icsk_pmtu_cookie);

tcp_snd_una_update(tp, ack);

return flag;

3

if (*last_oow_ack_time) {
 s32 elapsed = (s32)(tcp_jiffies32 - *last_oow_ack_time);

if (0 <= elapsed && elapsed < net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_invalid_ratelimit)
 NET_INC_STATS(net, mib_idx);
 return true; /# rate-limited: don't send yet! #/

*last_oow_ack_time = tcp_jiffies32;

return false; /* not rate-limited: go ahead, send dupack now! */

/* Return true if we're currently rate-limiting out-of-window ACKs and * thus shouldn't send a dupack right now. We rate-limit dupacks in * response to out-of-window SINs or ACKs for mitigate ACK loops or DoS * attacks that send repeated SINs or ACKs for the same connection. To * do this, we do not send a duplicate SINACK or ACK if the remote * endpoint is sending out-of-window SINs or pure ACKs at a high rate.

/* Data packets without SYNs are not likely part of an ACK loop. */
if ((TCF_SKB_CB(skb)->seq != TCF_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq) &&
 itcp_hdr(skb)->syn)

tcp_rate_skb_delivered(sk, skb, sack->rate);

/* Initial outgoing SYN's get put onto the write_queue

- * just like anything else we transmit. It is not * true data, and if we misinform our callers that * this ACK acks real data, we will erroneously exit
- * connection startup slow start one packet too
- * quickly. This is severely frowned upon behavior.

if (likely(!(scb->tcp_flags & TCPHDR_SYN))) {
 flag |= FLAG_DATA_ACKED;

} else {
 flag |= FLAG_SYN_ACKED;
 tp->retrans_stamp = 0;

if (!fully_acked) break:

tcp_ack_tstamp(sk, skb, ack_skb, prior_snd_una);

next = skb_rb_next(skb); if (unlikely(skb == tp->retransmit_skb_hint)) tp->retransmit_skb_hint = NULL; if (unlikely(skb == tp->lost_skb_hint)) tp->lost_skb_hint = NULL; top_highest_sack_replace(sk, skb, next); top_rtx_queue_unlika_d_free(skb, sk);

if (!skb)
 tcp_chrono_stop(sk, TCP_CHRONO BUSY);

if (skb) {

tcp_ack_tstamp(sk, skb, ack_skb, prior_snd_una); if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked & TCPCB_SACKED_ACKED) flag |= FLAG_SACK_RENEGING;

if (likely(first_ackt) && !(flag & FLAG_RETRANS_DATA_ACKED)) {
 seq_rtt_us = top_stamp_us_delta(tp->top_mstamp, first_ackt);
 ca_rtt_us = tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp->tcp_mstamp, last_ackt);

if (pkts_acked == 1 && last_in_flight < tp->mss_cache && last_in_flight && !prior_sacked && fully_acked && sack->rate->prior_delivered + 1 == tp->delivered && !(flag & (FLAG_CA_ALERT | FLAG_SYM_ACKED))) {

/* Conservatively mark a delayed ACK. It's typically
* from a lone runt packet over the round trip to
* a receiver w/o out-of-order or CE events.

flag = FLAG_ACK_MAYBE_DELAYED;

if (sack->first_sackt) +

sack_rtt_us = tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp->tcp_mstamp, sack->first_sackt); ca_rtt_us = tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp->tcp_mstamp, sack->last_sackt);

if (flag & FLAG ACKED)

if (tcp_is_reno(tp)) {

tcp_remove_reno_sacks(sk, pkts_acked, ece_ack);

/* If any of the cumulatively ACKed segments was * retransmitted, non-SACK case cannot confirm that * progress was due to original transmission due to * lack of TCPCB_SACKED_ACKED bits even if some of * the packets may have been never retransmitted.

int delta;

tcp_check_sack_reordering(sk, reord, 0);

delta = prior_sacked - tp->sacked_out; tp->lost_cnt_hint -= min(tp->lost_cnt_hint, delta);

*/
flag |= FLAG_SET_XMIT_TIMER; /* set TLP or RTO timer */

icsk->icsk_ca_ops->pkts_acked(sk, &sample);

#if FASTRETRANS_DEBUG > 0

MARN_ON((int)tp->sacked_out < 0); MARN_ON((int)tp->lost_out < 0); MARN_ON((int)tp->retrans_out < 0); if (Itp->packets_out && tcp_is_sack(tp)) { icsk = intercesk(sk); if (tp->lost_out) { pr_debug("Leak l=%u %d\n", tp-lost_out, icsk->icsk ca_state); }
}

tp->lost_out = 0;

if (tp->sacked_out) {
 pr_debug("teak s=%u %d\n",
 tp->sacked_out, icsk->icsk_ca_state);
 tp->sacked_out = 0;

/if (tp->retrans_out) {
 pr_debug("Leak r=%u %d\n",
 tp->retrans_out, icsk->icsk_ca_state);
 tp->retrans_out = 0;

#endif
 return flag;

static void tcp_ack_probe(struct sock *sk)

struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk); struct sk_buff *head = tcp_send_head(sk); const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);

/* Was it a usable window open? */
if (!head)
 return;

if (!after(TCP_SKB_CB(head)->end_seq, tcp_wnd_end(tp))) {
 icsk->icsk_packoff = 0;
 icsk->icsk_probes_tstamp = 0;
 inet_csk_clear_xmit_timer(sk, ICSK_TIME_PROBE0);
 /* Socket must be waked up by subsequent tcp_data_snd_check().
 * This function is not for random using!

} else {

unsigned long when = tcp_probe0_when(sk, TCP_RTO_MAX); when = tcp_clamp_probe0_to_user_timeout(sk, when); tcp_reset_xmit_timer(sk, ICSK_TIME_PROBE0, when, TCP_RTO_MAX);

static inline bool tcp ack is dubious(const struct sock *sk, const int flag)

return !(flag & FLAG_NOT_DUP) || (flag & FLAG_CA_ALERT) || inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ca_state != TCP_CA_Open;

/* Decide wheather to run the increase function of congestion control. */ static inline **bool tcp_may_raise_cwnd**(const struct **sock** *sk, const int **flag**)

- /* If reordering is high then always grow cwnd whenever data is
- * delivered regardless of its ordering. Otherwise stay conservative
- * and only grow cwnd on in-order delivery (RFC5681). A stretched ACK w/
- * new SACK or ECE mark may first advance cwnd here and later reduce
- * cwnd in tcp_fastretrans_alert() based on more states.
 */

return flag & FLAG_DATA_ACKED;

The "ultimate" congestion control function that aims to replace the rigi cwnd increase and decrease control (top_cong_avoid,top_*cwnd_reduction). It's called toward the end of processing an ACK with precise rate information. All transmission or retransmission are delayed afterwards.

tic void tcp_cong_control(struct sock *sk, u32 ack, u32 acked_sac int flag, const struct rate sample *rs)

> nst struct inet_cor lection soft fint inet_csk(sk) (icsk->icsk_ca_opt = Neeting for the inet_csk(sk) icsk->icsk_ca_ops->cong_control(sk, rs);

(tcp_in_cwmd realing lers

tcp_update_pacing_rate(sk

/* Check that window update is acceptable.
* The function assumes that snd_una<=ack<=snd_next.
*/</pre>

const usz nw

return after(ack, tp->snd_una) || after(ack_seq, tp->snd_w11) || (ack_seq == tp->snd_w11 && nwin > tp->snd_wnd);

/* If we update tp->snd_una, also update tp->bytes_acked */
static void tcp_snd_una_update(struct tcp_sock *tp, u32 ack)

u32 delta = ack - tp->snd_una;

sock_owned_by_me((struct sock *)tp);
tp->bytes_acked += delta;

WRITE_ONCE(tp->rcv_nxt, seq)

/* Update our send window.

* Window update algorithm, described in RFC793/RFC1122 (used in linux-2.2
* and in FreeBSD. NetBSD's one is even worse.) is wrong.

static int tcp_ack_update_window(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, u32 ack_seq)
u32 ack_seq)

struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); int flag = 0; u32 nwin = ntohs(tcp hdr(skb)->window)

if (likely(!tcp_hdr(skb)->syn))
 nwin <<= tp->rx_opt.snd_wscale;

if (tcp_may_update_window(tp, ack, ack_seq, nwin)) {
 flag |= FLAG_WIN_UPDATE;
 tcp_update_w1(tp, ack_seq);

if (tp->snd_wnd != nwin) {
 tp->snd_wnd = nwin;

/* Note, it is the only place, where
 * fast path is recovered for sending TCP.

tp->pred_flags = 0; tcp_fast_path_check(sk);

if (nwin > tp->max_window) {
 tp->max_window = nwin;
 tcp sync mss(sk, inet csk(sk)->icsk pmtu cookie);

}

tcp_snd_una_update(tp, ack);

return flag;

if (0 <= elapsed && elapsed < net->ipv4.sysctl_cop_invalid_ratelimit)
 NET_INC_STATS(net, mib_idx);
 return true; //# rate-limited: don't send yet! #/

*last_oow_ack_time = tcp_jiffies32;

return false; /* not rate-limited: go ahead, send dupack now! */

/* Return true if we're currently rate-limiting out-of-window ACKs and * thus shouldn't send a dupack right now. We rate-limit dupacks in * response to out-of-window SINs or ACKs to mitigate ACK loops or DOS * attacks that send repeated SINs or ACKs for the same connection. To * do this, we do not send a duplicate SINACK or ACK if the remote * endpoint is sending out-of-window SINs or pure ACKs at a high rate.

tcp rate skb delivered(sk, skb, sack->rate) unsigned long when = tcp_probe0_when(sk, TCP_RTO_MAX) when = tcp_clamp_probe0_to_user_timeout(sk, when); tcp_reset_xmit_timer(sk, ICSK_TIME_PROBE0, when, TCP_RTO_MAX); if (flag & FLAG_RETRANS_DATA_ACKED) flag &= ~FLAG_ORIG_SACK_ACKED; int delta: if (likely(!(scb->tcp_flags & TCPHDR_SYN))) { flag |= FLAG_DATA_ACKED; a syn ACKEL a syn min(tp->lost_cnt_hint, delta); ck_rtt_us > tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp->tcp_mstamp) tcp_ack_tstamp(sk, skb, ack_skb, tcp_skb_timestamp_us(skb))) next = skb_rb_next(skb); if (unlikely(sk) == tp->retransmit_skb_hint)) tp->retransmit_skb_hint = NULL; if (unlikely(sk) == tp->lost_skb_hint)) tp_highest_sack_replace(sk, skb, next); tcp_rts_queue_unlik_and_free(skb, sk); flag |= FLAG_SET_XMIT_TIMER; /* set TLP or RTO timer */ if (icsk->icsk_ca_ops->pkts_acked) { struct ack_sample sample = { .pkts_acked = pkts_acked, .rtt_us = sack->rate->rtt_us, .in_flight = last_in_flight }; tcp_chrono_stop(sk, TCP_CHRONO_BUSY); f (likely(between(tp->snd_up, prior_snd_una, tp->snd_una))) icsk->icsk_ca_ops->pkts_acked(sk, &sample); tp->snd_up = tp->snd_una; WARN ON((int)tp->sacked out < 0); WARN_ON((int)tp->lost_out < 0); WARN_ON((int)tp->retrans_out < 0 if (!tp->packets_out && tcp_is_sack(tp)) { if (likely(first_ackt) %% !(flag & FLAG_RETANS_DATA_ACKED)) { seq_rtt_Us = tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp>-tcp_mstamp, first_ackt); ca_rtt_us = tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp>-tcp_mstamp, last_ackt); icsk = inet csk(sk); if (tp->lost_out) pr_debug("Leak l=%u %d\n" if (pkts_acked == 1 && last_in_flight < tp->mss_cache && last_in_flight && !prior_sacked && fully_acked && sack->rate->prior_delivered + 1 == tp->delivered && tp->lost_out, icsk->icsk_ca_state); tp->lost_out = 0; (flag & (FLAG_CA_ALERT | FLAG_SYN_ACKED))) { if (tp->sacked_out) { pr_debug("Leak s=%u %d\n" tp->sacked_out, icsk->icsk_ca_state); tp->sacked_out = 0; flag |= FLAG_ACK_MAYBE_DELAYED; if (tp->retrans_out) { pr_debug("Leak r=%u %d\n", tp->retrans_out, icsk->icsk_ca_state); if (sack->first sackt) sack_rtt_us = tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp->tcp_mstamp, sack->first_sackt) ca_rtt_us = tcp_stamp_us_delta(tp->tcp_mstamp, sack->last_sackt); tp->retrans_out = 0; return flag; f (flag & FLAG ACKED) flag |= FLAG_SET_XMIT_TIMER; /* set TLP or RTO timer */ static void tcp ack probe(struct sock *sk) itacy = find_sst_Ant_intex, f = for the first fir struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk); struct sk_buff *head = tcp_send_head(sk); const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); if (tcp is reno(tp)) + tcp remove reno sacks(sk, pkts acked, ece ack); if (!head) if (!after(TCP_SKB_CB(head)->end_seq, tcp_wnd_end(tp))) { icsk->icsk backoff = 0; icsk->icsk probes tstamp = 0; inet csk clear xmit timer(sk, ICSK TIME PROBEO);

static inline bool tcp ack is dubious(const struct sock *sk, const int flag) return !(flag & FLAG_NOT_DUP) || (flag & FLAG_CA_ALERT) || inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ca_state != TCP_CA_Open; /* Decide wheather to run the increase function of congestion control. */
static inline bool tcp may raise cwnd(const struct sock *sk, const int flag) return flag & FLAG DATA ACKED; Event return flag: handlers static inline bool tcp_may_update_window(const struct tcp_sock *tp, const u32 ack, const u32 ack seq, const u32 nwin) return after(ack, tp->snd_una) after(ack seq, tp->snd wl1) $(ack_seq == tp -> snd_wll \&\& nwin > tp -> snd_wnd);$

/* If we update tp->snd_una, also update tp->bytes_acked */
static void tcp_snd_una_update(struct tcp_sock *tp, u32 ack)

u32 delta = ack - tp->snd_una;

sock_owned_by_me((struct sock *)tp);
tp->bytes acked += delta;

WRITE_ONCE(tp->rcv_nxt, seq)

static int tcp_ack_update_window(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, u32 ack, u32 ack_seq)

struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); int flag = 0; u32 nwin = ntohs(tcp_hdr(skb)->window)

if (likely(!tcp_hdr(skb)->syn))
 nwin <<= tp->rx_opt.snd_wscale

if (tcp_may_update_window(tp, ack, ack_seq, nwin)) {
 flag |= FLAG_WIN_UPDATE;
 tcp_update_wl(tp, ack_seq);

if (tp->snd_wnd != nwin) {
 tp->snd_wnd = nwin;

tp->pred_flags = 0; tcp_fast_path_check(sk);

if (nwin > tp->max_window) {
 tp->max window = nwin: tcp sync mss(sk, inet csk(sk)->icsk pmtu cookie);

tcp snd una update(tp, ack);

if (*last_oow_ack_time) {
 s32 elapsed = (s32)(tcp_jiffies32 - *last_oow_ack_time);

if (0 <= elapsed && elapsed < net->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_invalid_ratelimit)
 NRT_INC_STATS(net, mib_idx);
 return true; /* rate-limited; don't send yet! */

*last_oow_ack_time = tcp_jiffies32;

return false: /* not rate-limited: go ahead, send dupack now! >

bool tcp oow rate limited(struct net *net, const struct sk buff *skb, int mib idx, u32 *last_oow_ack_time)

if ((TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq != TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq) && !tcp_hdr(skb)->syn)

Abagnale uses program synthesis to reverse engineer CCAs





Abagnale reverse engineers CCAs by synthesizing event handlers





CCAs are modeled as a set of handler functions

 $h(cwnd_i, signals_i) = cwnd_{i+1}$

The output of each execution of each handler is used as input to the next execution

 $h(cwnd_0, signals_0) = cwnd_1$ $h(cwnd_1, signals_1) = cwnd_2$ $h(cwnd_2, signals_2) = cwnd_3$ $h(cwnd_3, signals_3) = cwnd_4$ $h(cwnd_4, signals_4) = cwnd_5$

 $h(cwnd_{n-1}, signals_{n-1}) = cwnd_n$

. . .



The behavior in the trace is the result of successive execution of the handlers



h: cwnd + MSS * acked-bytes / cwnd

Abagnale





Abagnale's synthesis pipeline



Abagnale's DSL defines the search space



Reverse-Engineering Congestion Control Algorithm Behavior

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Domain-Specific Language (DSL)

The DSL includes:

- The **congestion signals** that can be used as inputs ex: cwnd, MSS, acked-bytes, time-since-loss, RTT, min-RTT, ack-rate, ...
- The operators that can be used to combine them
 ex: +, -, /, *, if-then-else, <, >, ...
- Numerical **constants** c₁, c₂, c₃, ...

Handlers are compositions of DSL components

TCP Reno 1.2 1.0 (ind) 1.0 (ind) 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 2.5 5.0 7.5 10.0 12.5 15.0 Time (s)

h: cwnd + MSS * acked-bytes / cwnd



Handlers are compositions of DSL components

TCP Reno 1.21.0in flight (Mbit) 0.40.20.0 12.52.55.07.510.015.0Time (s) h: cwnd + MSS * acked-bytes / cwnd 3 operators

Handlers are compositions of DSL components

TCP Reno 1.21.0in flight (Mbit) 9.0 0.40.20.012.52.55.07.510.0 15.0Time (s) h: cwnd + MSS * acked-bytes / cwnd 3 congestion signals + 3 operators













Abagnale's enumeration traverses the search space



Solver-based pruning removes 99.9999% of the search space

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Solver-based pruning removes all handlers that

- do not type-check,
- do not unit-check,
- are algebraically equivalent to other handlers
- would never increase or never decrease the signal they are computing

• . .

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- would never increase or never decrease the signal they are computing

it still leaves >100k handlers in the search space to be explored

Partition the space to parallelize the search



Partition the space to parallelize the search







Partition the space to parallelize the search



We partition the search space such that parts:

- are disjoint
- can be encoded in the enumerator



Abagnale



We simulate each candidate CCA in the same conditions that we collected the trace



We simulate each candidate CCA in the same conditions that we collected the trace



We get a second trace, the synthesized trace, and we can compare them.

We will never find a CCA that exactly matches a noisy trace



Unrealistic!



We will never find an exact match, so we look for an *approximate* match



We look at the *distance* between the synthesized and the collected traces

We will never find an exact match, so we look for an *approximate* match



We look at the *distance* between the synthesized and the collected traces, and select the CCA handler with the minimum distance

Abagnale



Evaluation

Carnegie Mellon University



We compare the semantics of Abagnale's synthesized handler with a handwritten version of the handler finetuned by a domain expert

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We evaluate Abagnale in

• 13 Linux kernel CCAs

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Abagnale finds semantically correct handlers for "Reno-like" CCAs, and semantically proximate handlers for "Vegas-like" and BBR.

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See complete evaluation in the paper!

BBR: Abagnale's synthesized handler with BBR traces mimics PROBE_BW pulses, but with a different trigger



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Reverse-Engineering Congestion Control Algorithm Behavior

Abagnale outputs *simple* implementations of Congestion Control Algorithms from packet traces showing their behavior

- domain-specific strategies allow us to narrow the search space
- we capture the behavior of 13 CCAs from the Linux kernel without any prior knowledge

Margarida Ferreira

margarida@cmu.edu marghrid.github.io

